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ABSTRACT 
Authentication: Can Mobile Environments be Secured? (April 1999) 
Charles Austin Cropper 
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Udo W, Pooch 
A mobile system is defined as a network in which one or more of the interconnection 
links is a wireless medium. Wireless media include but are not limited to, cellular or radio 
transmissions, satellite services, and wireless computer networks. 
The fundamental operations of storage, processing, and transmission of information are 
undergoing such rapid improvement that the application of securing mobile systems cannot keep 
up with the rate of advance. This research analyzes security problems and investigates possible 
solutions that stem irom the absence of a "fixed" link between the user and service provider in 
mobile systems. 
This research approaches all security issues fiom the authentication standpoint, i. e. the 
process of reliably verifying the identity of two parties in a communication channel. Once 
identities have been verified, the channel authenticity must be maintained. 
Mobile communication systems that utilize three systems, symmetric ciphers, public key 
systems, and zero-knowledge techniques, are shown to be highly secure. The level security is 
not degraded due to the absence of a "fixed" link between the user and service provider. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER Page 
I INTRODUCTION. 
A, Statement of the Problem. 
B. Definitions of Terms, 
II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A. Issues Rehtted to Mobile Environments: An Overview . . . . . 
B. Sectility Goals and Threats 
C. Cryptography . 
D. Applications of Authentication . 
E. Symmetric Ciphers. . . , 
F. Public Key Algorithms . 
G. Zero-Knowledge Protocols 
III CONCLUSION . 










LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 
1 General Encryption Scheme 




3 Authentic Mobile Network . . . 27 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Wireless mobile communications is one of the fastest growing sectors of the 
Information Technology (IT) industry. Estimations predict that by the year 2000 there will be 
more than 110 million mobile users, such as cellular subscribes, compared to 22 million that 
existed in 1995 [15]. As wireless mobile communication systems grow, data security hazards 
increase. Increasing information transmittal, done via wireless mobile systems, is assisted by 
new inventions. The fundamental operations of storage, processing, and transmission of 
information are undergoing such rapid improvement that securing of mobile systems, i. e. 
guarding against signal interception verses allowing communication access, cannot keep pace 
with the rate of advance [9]. With the rapid rate of advance come data security issues such as 
fraud, espionage, or privacy violation. 
Vedder [27] cautioned that, because there is no "fixed" link between the user and a 
service provider, which could serve to "identify" the user for routing and billing purposes, 
security problems exist. Since the identity of the user must be verified over an air 
electromagnetic interface, authentication by means of cryptography must be established if 
impostors are to be precluded Rom taking on the identity of another individual and 
"transferring" or falsely attributing calls and charges. 
Farmer [11] stated that despite the many practical benefits of mobile systems, activities 
that transpire using mobile technology result m significant new security threats. The primary 
complication stems from processes or transactions occurring through multiple channels, or 
Communications of the ACM was used as a style guide for this manuscript. 
domains, each with their own respective degree or level of security. Differing levels of 
security can adversely impact functiouality and are recognized as critical to the acceptability of 
mobile communication systems. The "weakest" channel through which an information 
transaction occurs determines the degree of security. 
As modern technology has led to the introduction of new methods of speech 
transmission, the susceptibility of communications to interception and/or intentional 
corruption also increases. It is now possible to intercept satellite transmissions fiom a secluded 
safe location whereas in the past an intervenor would have been obligated to dig up cables or 
at least maintain a presence at a particular location to intercept a message. Mobile systems, in 
essence, allow interception without active physical intervention. The development of 
mechanisms that provide privacy and high levels of security in modern communications is 
increasing in importance [6]. 
A. Statement of the Problem 
Mobile commutucation environments do not require a physical link in the form of a 
copper wire, fiber optic glass, or cable between the user and the receiver, Security of the 
mobile communication system, therefore, becomes a sine quar non of the system [27]. Because 
messages transmitted via electronic form can be modified and/or monitored without the 
knowledge of the sender or receiver, security issues are considered critical to the acceptability 
of distributed mobile systems [I I]. The purpose of this paper is to examine the literature 
concerning authentication, between a user and a service provider, with respect to mobile 
communication environments and deduce which forms of authentication may be best suited for 
mobile environments. 
B. Definitions of Terms 
A uthenticatiott. Determining whether or not a particular message, is most likeiy 
delivered to its intended recipient irom its claimed source passing through a possible 
arbitrator [25]. 
Cipher. An encryption scheme, i. e. a set of transformations that change readable text 
(plaintext) into secret text (ciphertext) [19]. 
Cryptography. The art of secret writing [17]. The branch of mathematics based on the 
transformation of data [26]. 
Mobile System. A communication system requiring no physical link between the user 
and a service provider [27]. 
Protocols. Consists of a set of procedures by which activities transpire. 
Smart Card. Resembles a credit card in appearance. Smart cards have embedded, 
single-chip microcomputers specifica)ly designed to deliver information (stored data, 
computation results) and/or modify its contents (data storage, event memorization) when 
exposed to an outside element [14]. The smart card must be able to ascertain that a uniquely 
identifiable person is utilizing the card. Some smart cards inhibit use after a certain number of 
utilizations. Memory sizes and computation speeds are utilized together in more sophisticated 
cards; therefore, more and more detailed mechanisms become available ensuring increased 
security. 
Smart cards have been used in banking systems as advanced debit cards, where the 
card stores pertinent information such as a person' s balance. Some access cards are smart 
cards. Some telephone systems use smart cards as a simple pre-payment system for phone 
calls and deduct the cost of a phone call from the card upon completion. 
Zero-knowledge. A cryptographic technique by which possession of information can be 
verified without any part of that information being revealed to the verifier or to any third 
party [12], 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This review focuses on the issues rehted to the security requirements and security 
features of a mobile communication system. Literature pertaining to authentication related 
issues which include security goals and threats, cryptography, and applications of 
authentication in heterogeneous and homogenous mobile environments is also discussed. 
Finally, a rationale for a multi-component system based on symmetric ciphers, modern public 
key algorithms, together with techniques fiom zero-knowledge proof algorithms will be 
proffered as the preferred method of security. 
A. Issues Related to Securing Mobile Environments: An Overview 
First and foremost, the crux of the following discussion involves the absence of a 
physical connection between two parties in correspondence. 
Since the turn of the century, almost all information conveyance, of the electronic 
form, has been relayed over wires or cables. Only now as the twenty-first century arrives is 
information flying around the globe aided solely by satellites and the occasional base station. 
The presence of a "wire" created a system by which people could restrict who received or 
participated in conversations. Albeit, interlopers could "tap" into wires and steal private 
information: however, the intruders had to understand how to "tap" mto the wires and, more 
importantly, know the precise location of the wires. With mobility, wires disappear. The air 
becomes the "wires*' of mobile communication systems; therefore, these new "wires" lie pray 
to vandals, as they are everywhere. The location of the wires, once a security asset, now 
becomes a liability. 
Of the three main operations carried out in wireless mobile environments, (1) storage, 
(2) processing and (3) transmission, the transmission of information carries the maximum 
security risks. Since it is difficult to make a widespread network physically secure, many 
security measures depend on information masking techniques such as cryptography. 
Designing a system for security means analyzing an adversary problem where both the 
designer and the opponents are each independently thinking out their respective strategies. 
This type of "game theory" is extremely difficult to master and merely serves to illustrate both 
the underlying complexity of the problem and the inadequacy of a naive "risk analysis" 
approach [9]. 
Mobile authentication transforms the information arena, as well as the access points to 
information into a fluid, amorphous environment. An individual utilizing a cellular phone 
must be able to verify his identity f'rom multiple locations, all of which involve differing 
degrees of security. Some locations considered "hostile" might eavesdrop on conversations or 
in extreme cases, cause financial harm 'The increasing and increasingly diverse demand for 
security by users, operators. and regulatory bodies calls for more advanced security features in 
third-generation systems such as UMTS [Universal Mobile Telecommunications System, The 
European Cellular and Satellite System]" [13]. 
Current efforts in Europe and also by the ITU international Telecommunication 
Union) have focused on standardizmg access systems to wireless networks as well security 
protocols. Advanced Communications Technologies and Services (ACTS) has also launched a 
project, ASPeCT (Advanced Security for Personal Communications Technologies), whose 
goal is to "specify such advanced [security] features and verify their feasibility and 
acceptability" [131. 
B. Security Goals and Threats 
Our society is dependent upon the ability to transmit spoken messages quickly and 
accurately. Both business and leisure activities depend upon mobile systems for information. 
Numerous channels for the transmission of information are available for a mobile system of 
communication — the worldwide telephone network and a large number of private and 
military radio communication systems. The number of individuals utilizing these mobile 
systems of communication increases each year. 
As the number of mobile systems of communication users increase each year Moreau 
[20] estimates that the mobile communication industries will lose millions due to fraud. 
Prevention and detection of fraud and 1'raudulent activities, therefore, are important and 
desirable goals for mobile system users. With many individuals utilizing mobile systems for 
multiple purposes, security and privacy are an ever-increasing issue. The need to conceal and 
protect the content of one's message is important; therefore, the user and service provider must 
consider: (1) amount of protection required, (2) authentication techniques, and (3) cost [6], 
From the initial development of mobile systems, security was considered important. 
Firewalls, gateways controlling access between one network and other networks or between a 
single computer (host) and a network, developed in the early 1990s, became first-line defenses 
for security. While this single-dimensional (first generation) security measure was adequate 
during the early stages of mobile communication, the industry of today has shifted its security 
efforts to multi-dimensional security techniques [4]. 
Multi-dimensional, multi-layer security systems are currently being developed for 
additional security. This second, and developing third generation, utilizes multiple methods 
and mechanisms to create as secure a security system as possible. This secmity system 
involves devices specifically designed for (1) prevention, (2) detection, and (3) response [4]. 
Preventive security tools include firewalls, Virtual Private Networks, application-level 
encryption, user authentication, and content screening software. These mechanisms are 
designed to prevent break-ins, tampering, or unwanted access. 
Detection devices read a source of data, i. e. network traffic, system logs, or audit trail 
information, and take appropriate action upon detection. Some detection devices include 
network and system scanners, misuse and anomaly detectors, content screening and antiviral 
software. 
Response devices feature response capabilities in addition to their detection features. 
Often referred to as "adaptive defense mechanisms, " response devices sound alarms, send 
email messages, transmit messages to a pager, shut down a user account, shunt connections 
&om an attacker's address, and replace damaged files [4]. 
Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) and Digital Enhanced Cordless 
Telecommunications (DECT), second generation systems, included for the first time, security 
features based on cryptographic techniques. These cryptographic techniques proved 
successful in preventing fi'aud. The increasingly diverse demand for security by users, 
operators, and regulatory bodies requires more advanced security features in third generation 
systems, such as UMTS [18]. 
ASPeCT presents several approaches to identify Iraudulent behavior. Through the 
implementation of the rule-based approach, both the absolute and differential usage are 
verified against certain rules. This 1'raud detection approach worked best when user profiles 
contained explicit information, such as I'raud criteria referred to as rules. The implementation 
of this approach is based on an existing rule-based tool for audit trail analysis known as PDAT 
(Protocol Data Analysis Tool). PDAT is a rule-based tool for intrusion detection developed by 
Siemens ZFE (Corporate Research and Development). PDAT has the possibility of online 
analysis and works in heterogeneous environments [20]. 
Neural networks, another tectuuque utihzed to identify traudulent behavior, utilizes 
flexible and adaptive protocols to implement pattern recognition problems. Neural networks 
are systems of elementary decision units that are adapted by training in order to recognize and 
classify arbitrary 
patterns. 
Neural networks are currently being utilized in telephone networks 
throughout the world [5], [28]. 
In sum, there are four contemporary goals considered in information security, 
confidentiality of data, integrity of data, availability of data, and legitimate use of data [12]. 
Nearly all four goals have been described in the scenarios presented previously. Some projects 
focus more heavily on certain goals than others in their respective views of mobile systems. 
C. Cryptography 
Cryptography is formed trom two Greek words, xpmro meaning secret and ypctpt] 
meaning writing. Coincidentally, cryptography is art of secret writing [17]. 
Swanson [26] stated that cryptography is a branch of mathematics based on the 
transformation of data. Cryptography provides an important tool for protecting information 
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and provides mobile system users the ability to send information between participants in such 
a way that third parties cannot understand the message. The most common form of 
cryptography represents information as numbers and mathematically manipulates the numbers. 
The message, in its original form, is known as plaintext. The encrypted text is known as 







Figure 1 General Encryption Scheme 
Algorithms and secret values form the foundation of cryptographic systems. The secret 
is known as the "key". When a key is combined with an algorithm, it becomes more difficult 
to develop new algorithms allowing for reversible scrambling of information. The key is 
analogous to the combination for a combination lock, although the concept of a combination 
lock is well known, one cannot open the lock without the combination [17]. 
Cryptography can be called upon to provide four major "services" [19]. 
1. Confidentiality. Information is kept in context with those who are authorized to 
access and/or use it. 
2, Integrity, Maintenance against message modification during transit. 
3. /i/onrepudi ation. Guard against denial of message transnuttal when a sender truly 
sent a particular message, 
4. Authentication. Ascertain a message origin as well as the identification of the 
sending party. 
In order to ensure security, the ciphertext must not reveal any possible information 
about the plaintext, except possibly its length. The key should be reasonably long, and 
normally, a key should be not reused. By "reasonably, " a key should be long enough not to 
degrade the strength of an algorithm. A good cryptographic algorithm keeps this information 
to a minimum and utilizes a compression program to reduce the size of the text before 
encryptmg it. Compression reduces the redundancy of the message as well as the volume of 
work required to encrypt and decrypt [24]. 
In recent years, typical cipher based cryptography has been augmented to include 
public key algorithms. Number theory created public key algorithms stemming f'rom difficulty 
in factoring extremely large numbers. Public key cryptography is useful because of its ease of 
configurability and implementation in network settings [17]. The gist of public key systems is 
the existence of a biparte key split into public and private halves. When a sender wishes to 
encrypt using a public key algorithm, the sender encrypts his message with the receiver' s 
public key and only the receiver with the paired private key can decrypt the message. The 
mathematics involved is fairly complicated and not necessary to the understanding of the 
underlying concepts; thus they will not be discussed further. 
Modern cryptography is used to provide numerous security devices such as digital 
signatures, encrypted tunnels (for Virtual Private Networks), and normal symmemc ciphers. 
Several important issues should be considered when designing, implementing, and integrating 
cryptography in a mobile system [26]: 
1. Select Design and Implementation Standards. Managers and users of mobile 
systems must select among various criteria when deciding to use cryptography. Their selection 
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should be based on cost-effectiveness analysis, trends in the standard's acceptance, and 
interoperability requirements, In addition, each criterion should be carefully analyzed to 
determine if it is applicable to the organization and the desired application. 
2. Decide on Hardware vs. Sofiware Implementations. The trade-offs among security, 
cost, simplicity, efficiency, and ease of implementation need to be studied by managers 
acquiring various security products, Cryptography can be implemented m either hardware or 
software; each has related costs and benefits. 
3. Manage Keys. All keys need to be protected against modification and secret keys 
and private keys need protection against unauthorized disclosur. Key management involves 
the procedures and protocols, both manual and automated, used throughout the entire life cycle 
of the keys. This includes the generation, distribution, storage, enny, use, destruction, and 
archiving of cryptographic keys. 
4. Secure Cryptog raphi c Modules, The proper functioning of cryptography requires 
the secure design, implementation, and use of the cryptographic module. Actions required 
include protecting the module against tampering, Cryptography is typically implemented in a 
module of software, firmware, hardware, or some combination thereof. This module contains 
the cryptographic algorithm(s), certain control parameters, and temporary storage facilities for 
the key(s) being used by the algorithm(s). 
5. Comply with Export Rules. Users must be aware that the U. S. Government controls, 
via civil and criminal penalties, the export of cryptographic implementations. The rules 
governing export can be quite complex, since they consider multiple factors. In addition, 
cryptography is a rapidly changing field, and rules may change fiom time to time. Questions 
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concerning the export of a particular implementation should be addressed to appropriate legal 
counsel, 
D. Applications of Authentication 
Protocols abound in human society. A nominal protocol consists of a set of procedures 
by which activities transpire. For example, the protocol of a restaurant is to seat the 
customers, take their orders, prepare the orders, serve their orders, and so forth At junctions 
in a protocol, decisions occur which determine whether acts, or orders, will transfer Rom a 
sending party, such as the restaurant, to a receiving party, such as customers waiting on their 
food. In the heart of authentication are protocols. 
Authentication is nothing more than determining whether or not a particular message, 
or food delivery in the case of the restaurant, is most likely delivered to its intended recipient 
from its claimed source passing through a possible arbitrator [25]. Scenarios which typify 
non-authentic activities include, i) the restaurant bringing a customer a wrong order, ii) the 
customer ordering Rom a bus-boy instead of a waiter, or iii) the manager (arbitrator) voiding 
an order which may prevent customers' eating, All three cases keep two tasks from 
completing, the customers' eating and the restaurant making a sale. The case where an order is 
placed with the proper restaurant personnel, cooked correctly, delivered correctly to the 
waiting customer, and in which the customer satisfactorily consumes and pays for the meal 
yields an authentic event. The subset of all scenarios that yield successful transactions is 
determined by an authentication protocol. 
Authentication can be either unilateral or mutual; i. e. is one or are both parties in a 
message transaction being authenticated [12]. Arbitrators can exist, like the manager of the 
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restaurant, and are assumed to exist only as an unbiased judge during message conveyance. 
Situations, as in the restaurant example, arise when either party, henceforth known as the 
claimant and verifier, dispute or otherwise reject each other's claim and/or identity. Cases also 
exist where a third party, henceforth an eavesdropper, can disrupt the flow of a message. An 
example, using the restaurant analogy, of an eavesdropper would be a thief that steals a 
customer's wallet before the customer pays for his meal. 
Throughout the rest of this paper, the claimant and verifier are treated as mutually 
mistrusting or always adversarial, The arbitrator will act only in accordance with the rules 
established by an authentication system, and eavesdroppers will always be taken into account. 
Generalized authentication protocols fall into three categories delineated by the 
mechanism they employ in verification. The basis of identification may be determined by 
something known, something possessed, or something inherent [9]. The attribute known, 
possessed, or inherent need not belong to a human but may also be determined by something 
non-human. 
Beginning with known facts, verification can be determined through devices such as 
passwords, combinations, or any profusion of knowledge, which can be delivered upon request 
to a verifier. An individual's mother's maiden name exemplifies knowledge based verification 
system. 
Possessed articles can also lend to verification systems. Common objects people use 
on a daily basis are keys. They are physical in nature and require possession in order to be 
useful to an individual The situation where someone is locked out of their automobile brings 
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to mind authentication via possession except the required possession is inside the car rather 
than being within the owner's hands. 
Inherent information is a dichotomy of hnmutable properties, including physical 
characteristics and involuntary actions. Examples of physical attributes include retinal 
patterns, fingerprints, and hand geometries. Involuntary actions include handwritten 
signatures and voice patterns. Both types of inherent information stem from an individual and, 
typically, are immutable. These attributes can be used to verify someone' s identity in an 
authentication protocol [19]. 
At this stage, it must be stressed that all authentication protocols have a probability of 
failure; therefore, the goal of a "good" authentication system is to minimize the probability of 
deception [25]. The gist in minimizing this probability arises fi. om restricting the set of 
messages which culminate in authentication. In other words, only certain events, in a certain 
order, will yield an authentic message. Cryptography is often employed to define this 
restricted subset of instances yielding authentic events. 
Authentication and entity identification form another critical foundation of computer 
security. These components form the basis for most types of access conn ol and for 
establishing user accountability. Authentication protocols utilizing cryptographic designs are 
based on the principle of convincing a verifier that, because a claimant knows a secret key, that 
claimant is the true principal. Authentication and identification form technical measures that 
prevent unauthorized people (or unauthorized processes) f'rom entering a mobile system. 
Access control usually requires that the system have the capability of identifying and 
differentiating among users. For example, access control refers to the granting to users of only 
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those accesses minimally required to perform their respective duties. User accountability 
requires the linking of activities on a mobile system to specific individuals and, therefore, 
requires the system to identify users [12]. 
The following should be considered when requiring authentication [26]: 
1. Require users to authenticate. An organization should require users to authenticate 
their claimed identities on IT systems, It may. be desirable for users to authenticate themselves 
with a single log-in. This requires the user to authenticate themselves only once and then be 
able to access a wide variety of applications and data available on local and remote systems. A 
side-affect exists, though, because requiring only a single log-in creates a single point of 
failure. Once logged-in, an imposter can have fic rein in a system. User authentication 
should, therefore, be augmented to include multiple levels of identification checks scattered 
through a user's session. 
2. Restrict access to authentication data. An organization should restrict access to 
authentication data. Authentication data should be protected with access controls and 
unidirectional encryption to prevent unauthorized individuals, such as hackers from obtaining 
the data. 
3. Secure transmission of authentication data. An organization should protect 
authentication data transmitted over public or shared data networks. When authentication data, 
such as a password, is transmitted to a mobile environment, it can be electronically monitored. 
This can happen on the network used to transmit the password or on the mobile system itself. 
Simple encryption of a password that will be used again does not solve this problem because 
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encrypting the same password will create the same ciphertext; the ciphertext becomes the 
password. 
5. Limit log-on attempts. Organizations should limit the number of log-on attempts. 
Many operating systems can be configured to lock a user ID al'ter a set number of failed log-on 
attempts. This helps to prevent guessing of authentication data. 
6. Secure data as it is entered. Organizations should protect authentication data as it is 
entered into the mobile system, including suppressing the display of the password as it is 
entered and orienting keyboards away from view. 
7. Administer data properly. Organizations should carefully administer authentication 
data and tokens including procedures to disable lost or stolen passwords or tokens and 
monitoring systems to look for stolen or shared accounts. 
A perfect authentication system as defined by [25], is a system in which the probability 
of an intruder's success is equal to the uncertainty introduced into the system due to encoding. 
Realistic systems, however, do not have the luxury of pure coding theory, i. e. unlimited 
memory, unlimited time, and so forth. All mobile systems will be constrained in some way, 
and thus must be analyzed as being a non-perfect system. 
E. Symmetric Ciphers 
Common encryption systems like the Data Encryption Standard (DES) are symmetric 
ciphers. Symmetric ciphers are highly advanced forms of a simple Caesar cipher. A Caesar 
cipher is a monoalphabetic cipher, i. e. textual mapping of one letter for another [17]. With 
inclusion of mathematical functions and keys, monoalphabetic ciphers quickly transform into 
modern day symmetric ciphers. 
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One of the first influentia devices that used a symmetric cipher was the Enigma coding 
machine during World War II. It enabled Adolph Hitler's communications to occur in secret 
during the War. 
Modern symmetric ciphers are mathematical algorithms that take a message (phtintext) 
together with a key and perform some type of operation on the plaintext in corroboration with 
the key to yield the ciphertext. The operation. usually consists of mathematical and/or logical 
manipulation 
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) created the public realm of encryption in the 
mid-1970's when it was fully specified and released into the public domain. The Data 
Encryption Standard was adopted as a federal standard on November 23, 1976 and authorized 
for use on all unclassified government communications. It is defined under the American 
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 46-2 [21]. 
Never, before 1977, had a fully defined encryption algorithm been published and 
released into the public domain. The Data Encryption Standard was the first National Security 
Administration (NSA) sponsored algorithm released in such a fashion. The NSA thought DES 
was going to be used in hardware implementations only. The standard mandated a hardware 
implementation, but the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) now the National Institute of 
Standards dt. Technology (NIST) published enough details as to allow DES implementation in 
software [24]. 
DES is a block cipher algorithm; it encrypts data in 64-bit blocks. A 64-bit block of 
plaintext (normal text) enters one end of the algorithm and a 64-bit block of ciphertext 
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(encrypted text) exits. Since DES is symmeWc, the same key and algorithm are used for both 
encryption and decryption. 
DES uses a 56-bit key; actually a 64-bit key with 8 odd parity bits, one per byte within 
the key. The key can be any 56-bit number. A few combinations of weak keys k semi-weak 
keys exist which should be avoided as they destroy the cryptographic power of DES. AII 
security rests within the key. 
At the simplest level, the algorithm is nothing more than a combination of the two 
basic techniques of encryption; confusion and diffusion [24]. A combination of a substitution 
with a permutation, i. e. bit shuffling, constitute each of sixteen steps in DES known as a round. 
Rounds involve rearranging the bits within the input text in an effort to hide the original 
information. Just like shuffling a deck of cards, there is an optimal number of rounds 
(shuffles). Once the cards are sufficiently randomized, extra shuffles just waste time. The 
crux of a cryptographic system is determining the optimal number of rounds that. sufficiently 
secure the data while not degrading efficiency by using too many rounds. 
In modem times, more symmetric ciphers are being created and used. The prior 
description of DES gives a basic description of how most symmetric ciphers work. Modern 
algorithms include RC5, RC6, Blowfish and Twofish. The main premise, however, remains 
that the cryptographic system is bi-directional, i. e. encryptable and decryptable using the same 
key. 
Symmetric ciphers, specifically DES, have been the primary references when 
mentioning cryptography in last twenty years. More recently, though, a system has been 
introduced that "splits" the key. These systems are public key systems. 
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F. Public Key Algorithms 
Public key cryptography takes the "key" I'rom symmetric ciphers and splits it into two 
different pieces. It was invented in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman [10]. The logic behind the 
strength of public key algorithms lies in the ability to factor a large number which is a 
composite of large prime numbers. 
Given a public and private key pair, an individual establishes a rudimentary public key 
system by disseminating their public key to a key distribution center. Any person wishing to 
deliver a message to a specific person takes that person's respective public key and encrypts 
their message with the recipient's public key prior to sending it. Only the matched private key 
can decrypt the message. The reader is referred to [17] or [19] if desiring more information 
concerning mathematical underpinnings. 
Public key systems, albeit a strange system of encryption, provide for more than simple 
message passing. Public key systems also form the foundation for digital signatures, session 
key establishment, as well as standard encryption like that provided in Pretty Good Privacy 
[PGP) [17] 
Digital signature or digital certificate can be viewed as a cyberspace identification card 
like a driver's license [12]. The signature validates the sources of a particular public key. The 
algorithm used today for most digital signatures is RSA, 
RSA, named after its inventors, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, is a public key 
algorithm that does encryption as well as digital signatures. It functions by algebraic 
properties of exponentiation, i. e. S~ = S~ with x and y being numbers derived from the public 
and private keys. It functions identically for signature production. 
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The security of RSA together with most other public key cryptosystems is not known, 
It has been shown that if factoring large integers can be accomplished easily, then breaking the 
RSA encryption system is easy. After a decade of research into the strength of RSA, no easier 
method than factoring is known to break RSA [8]. The advantages of public key systems has 
been shown for years but they have their drawbacks. 
"Throughput rates for the most popular public key encryption systems are several 
orders of magnitude slower that the best known symmetric key systems" [19]. The key sizes 
used in public key cryptography are substantially larger than their counterparts in symmetric 
key cryptography, by substantially larger, compare 126 bits to 1024 bits. The length of the 
keys in public key systems result in slow operation of both: 'cryption and decryption. 
To ameliorate the operational speed of public key systems, a technique is used which 
mixes symmetric key cryptography and public key cryptography. A "session" key is randomly 
chosen Irom the initiator of an information transaction and encrypts the random session key 
with the public key system. The initiator then sends this temporary*' key to the recipient. All 
following encrypted communications will occur with the session key using a symmetric key 
system Since the key was randomly chosen and only utilized during a particular 
communication "session" it provides high levels of secmity without the high time consuming 
side-affects of public key cryptography [17]. 
Public key dissemination is another more pertinent problem, especially when applied to 
mobile communication envirotunents. Deciding who and where pubLic keys will be stored is a 
question left open to debate. The access becomes increasingly difficult when applied to 
multinational communication systems, i. e, when communication occurs across national 
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boundaries. The central key agencies are given the name Trusted Third Parties (TTP). The 
Jefferies, Mitchell, 4 Walker (JMW) scheme proposed by [16] created a system for TTP 
services. These services were originally intended to be used in conjunction with escrow 
systems like the Clipper system [22]. Now, the JMW system is applied to public key 
dissemination as well as escrowed keyed systems, One of the major areas of analysis in 
ASPeCT is the creation of TTPs [3]. 
G. Zero-Knowledge Protocols 
Zero-knowledge is one form of authentication. Zero-knowledge is an interactive proof 
system that involves having the verifier issue a number of challenges to the claimant. This 
interactive proof system is successful if it succeeds in proving the desired statements and 
nothing else. ln essence, the verification system occurs without aid trom digital signatmes, or 
public key encryption [19]. 
This latter form of cryptographic authentication shows great capacity for future 
application in authentication protocols. A zero-knowledge technique is a means by which 
*'possession of information can be revealed without any part of that information being 
revealed, either to the verifier or to any third party" [12], For example, zero-knowledge 
involves having the verifier issue a number of challenges to the claimant. The claimant 
responds to the responses, and the verifier is able to establish a satisfactorily high level of 
confidence that the claimant does possess the secret information, although no part of the secret 
information is actually disclosed in the responses, 
Stronger zero-knowledge cryptographic techniques vary in the number of challenge- 
response pairs required and the intricacy of the problem solving required at both ends. Guillou 
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and Quisquater [14] proposed using a smart card to establish zero-knowledge cryptology. The 
smart card resembles a credit card, but in actuality, it is a multipurpose, tamper-resistant 
security apparatus. A microcircuit is placed in the plastic base of the smart card, The 
microcircuit is adhered to a circuit board and connected to elec&cal contacts on the board. 
The purpose of the microcircuit is to deliver stored data and computation results and/or to 
modify its contents when interfaced with an outside element. 
"The zero-knowledge property implies that a prover executing the protocol . . . does not 
release any information . . . not otherwise computable in polynomial time fiom public 
information alone. Thus participation does not increase the chances of subsequent 
impersonation" [19]. Within some assumptions, [7] has shown that everything provable is 
provable in zero-knowledge. 
The restrictions that comprise assumptions made in zero-knowledge proofs concern 
level of zero-knowledge, i. e. computational or perfect zero-knowledge. "A protocol is 
computationally zero-knowledge if an observer restricted to probabilistic polynomial-time 
tests cannot distinguish real ]rom simulated transcripts. For perfect zero-knowledge, the 
probability distributions of the transcripts must be identical" [19]. A transcript is an 
information transaction, so for any information transaction to exist in a perfect zero-knowledge 
protocol, each interaction neither increases nor decreases the likelihood of impersonation. 
Quisquater and Guillou [23] explained zero-knowledge with an interesting litany 
concerning a cave. The cave had a secret passage, in the case of our cave, between C and D. 
Alice knows the secret to the cave and wants to "prove" to Bob that she knows it. To prove to 
Bob the following procedure occurs: 
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Bob stands at A while Alice goes to C or 
D. Once Alice is in position, she yells to Bob 
who then moves to B. Bob then shouts to Alice to 
either come from the C or D side of the cave. 
Alice, using the secret of the cave, comes out 
either side Bob requests. This procedure occurs 
C:::;P 
the number of times that satisfies Bob statistically Figure 2 Zero-Knowledge Cave 
that Alice must know the secret because the probability of her not knowing it would be 
increased by a factor of two each iteration. If Bob asked Alice twenty times then the 
probability that she would come out of the correct side every time up to twenty, assuming 
randomness, would be Vi or 0. 00009 7o. Stated differently, if Alice did not know the secret of 
the cave but only resorted to random chance, i. e. she would pick the same side Bob would later 
choose, she would have a 0. 00009% chance of picking the same side twenty times 
consecutively. Alice obviously knows the secret of the cave. 
Twisting the cave story to include a camcorder, if Bob recorded everything that 
happened previously, he would have a problem later hying to convince someone else that 
Alice knows the secret. The age-old cliche of "seeing is believing" applies. A third party 
could simply argue that the tape of Alice had been edited so that she came out the correct side 
of the cave each time. Thus, the property of a zero-knowledge proof exists; the real-life 
demonstration cannot. be distinguished from the videotaped, and Bob couldn' t leam anything 
from the real-life demonstration; therefore, Bob cannot learn anything Irom the taped 
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demonstration. "Zero" knowledge gets exchanged between Alice and Bob, except that Alice 
knows the secret to the cave, 
Zero-knowledge is stili in its infancy and only heavily investigated in Europe. No 
good physical implementations of zero-knowledge exist, whether in wired or wireless systems. 
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CONCLUSION 
A rationale for a multi-component system based on symmeWc ciphers with public key 
crypto maphy along with techniques fi'om zero-knowledge proof algorithms will now be 
presented as the preferred method of security in future mobile systems. 
All three of the systems listed previously have had differing levels of utilization in the 
last twenty years. Only within the last five years has zero-knowledge been heavily analyzed 
by academia. Public key systems have been in heavy use since RSA's inception, and 
symmetric ciphers have been used since the beginning of cryptography. 
Modem mobile communication systems exhibit properties that call for at minimum, 
symmetric ciphers with enhancements public key cryptography such as session keys. They 
also stipulate partial zero-knowledge proof characteristics such as challenge-response 
algorithms [2]. 
Modern cryptography, through information theory and complexity theory, has created 
several protocols by wtuch messages can be transmitted via an electronic medium and be 
nearly as secure as their physical counterparts. Mathematics allows many variables to be used 
when creating an authentication protocol, 
It is the author's opinion that current mobile systems will be secured via symmetric 
ciphers including some form of public key cryptography, As zero-knowledge ages, it will 
become more easily implementable and usable in mobile systems as a means of authentication. 
Mobile systems will be authenticatable and highly secure. The following example will 









A. Mobile Equipment — Would include 
devices such as cell phones 
B. Access System — Point of enny 
from the mobile environment into 
core network 
C, Core Network — May invoive 
Internet and/or company networks 
D. Services — Point where user desires 
access, either for data or processes 
Sefvlces 
Figure 3 Authentic Mobile Network 
The dashed line in figtue 3 represents the data link between A and D. It is established 
in the following manner. First, the mobile user (A) and access system (B) establish a 
connection using a challenge-response system over the air interface — the best place for a zero- 
knowledge protocol. Second, the user from A establishes a session to D through C and B 
using a public key protocol, The session is established by sending a symmetric cipher key 
encrypted using the services' public key, and subsequently the service (D) sending an 
acknowledgement back to A encrypted using the session key with a symmetric cipher. All 
subsequent communication is authentic )rom point A to D including the air interface. 
Current trends of society are pushing electronic media Irom standard phone systems or 
otherwise physicaHy "wired" systems towards media which are "wireless". The cellular phone 
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networks that exist today typify "wireless" communication networks, 'The increasing interest 
in wheless communications have made mobile systems possible. Mobile environments will 
extend the usability of current distributed systems by allowing users of mobile devices access 
to a large pool of networked resources . . . fiom almost anywhere in the world" [1]. 
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